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PETITION
Appellee and Plaintiff Larry J. Coet Used Car
Department petitions the Court of Appeals to "rehear" this
appeal, pursuant to Rule 35(a), Utah Rules of Appellate
Procedure.

Under the circumstances, this petition

functionally constitutes a request that the Court "hear"
this matter, in that the Court did not afford Coet a hearing
before ruling.

See Utah R. App. P. 29(a)(3); Memorandum

Decision, April 27, 1995.
Coet filed its Brief September 26, 1994. Appellant
Lopez filed a Reply Brief March 17, 1995, almost five (5)
months late.

The Court, approximately one month later,

reversed with only the following, cryptic comment:
"We reverse for the reasons stated in
appellant's reply brief."
If the cursory statements in Lopez7 Reply Brief truly
reflect the law, then this Court has implicitly endorsed a
significant modification of the law as it pertains to
recourse provisions under third-party financing paper, and
to assignments.

The Decision also ignores the findings made

by the Trial Court (Dennis Fuchs, Judge) and the testimony
of First Security Bank's officer Shirl Nichols and Coet's
Marsha Coet.

The Decision effectively eviscerates the

repurchase provisions of the Installment Sale Contract at
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issue, and deprives Coet of all rights under the repurchased
contract - without any cogent explanation of why Coet should
be deprived of those rights. At the very least, if this
Court is going to reverse based on the statements in Lopez'
Reply Brief, then it should do so in a published decision.
It should do so, because Lopez, in his Reply, does not
accurately portray existing law; and an endorsement of
Lopez7 statements implicitly effects a significant change in
the law.
This case involves the purchase by Lopez from Coet of a
used Ford Bronco.

Lopez made a significant down payment and

financed the balance through execution of an Installment
Sale Contract (the "Contract"), which was subsequently
assigned by Coet to First Security Bank, for value.

Lopez

made three payments to First Security Bank, then stopped.
He threatened to sue First Security Bank and Coet.1

First

Security requested that Coet repurchase the Contract,
consistent with the Assignment/Recourse provisions of the
Contract.

Coet did so.

fraud and other claims.

Lopez subsequently sued Coet for
Coet defended, and counterclaimed

for a deficiency (which included reasonable attorneys fees,
per the Contract).

The Trial Court found against Lopez on

1

Lopez, in fact, named First Security as a Defendant,
but did not serve First Security.
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all his causes of action and dismissed them with prejudice.
It found for Coet on its counterclaim.
On appeal, Lopez challenges only the award of attorneys
fees and the Contract based award of interest at the rate of
14.5 percent, as opposed to the non-contract statutory rate
of 10 percent.

Lopez theorizes that because First Security

stamped the Contract "PAID 3-13-92" when it delivered the
Contract back to Coet, that Lopez was therefore released
from any further contractual obligation under the Contract.
Lopez volunteers that he had only an "equitable" obligation
to repay Coet the sum it had paid to First Security.
First Security Bank's officer Shirl Nichols testified
that First Security Bank did not prepare a formal notice of
assignment because industry standard did not require it.
First Security's view was that inasmuch as Coet was the
first-party creditor on the Contract, Coet could simply
repurchase the Contract.

The Contract specifically defines

conditions under which "you [Coet] agree to repurchase the
Agreement on demand by paying us the full unpaid balance
together with accrued interest owing on the Agreement . . .
_i_"

(Emphasis added) . Contrary to Lopez' representation in

his Reply, Marsha Coet (R. 857, lines 21-25) and First
Security's Shirl Nichols (R. 816, lines 18-20; R. 821, lines
20-25) both testified that they understood that Coet had
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repurchased the Contract.

Subsequent to its repurchase of

the Contract, Coet notified Lopez that it had done so and
that he should make subsequent payments, to Coet.

This

notice complied with Utah Code Ann. §70A-9-318.
The fallacy of Lopez' argument, which this Court
endorses by reversing, is that there must necessarily be a
writing entitled "Assignment" and that, if there is not,
then Lopez was released of all contractual-based
obligations.

This is simply not the law.

need not be in writing.

An assignment

6 Am.Jur.2d Assignments §84 (1963).

No particular form is required to effectuate an assignment
of rights under a contract.

All that is required is that

the assignor express an intention to transfer his right to
the assignee.

4 Corbin on Contracts §879 at 528 (1951 ed.);

see also Restatement (Second) of Contracts §324 Comment a;
and authorities cited in Appellee's Brief.
may be relied on to determine intention.
Contracts §879.

Parol evidence

4 Corbin on

Contrary to Lopez' representation in his

Reply, testimony was elicited that confirms First Security's
intention that Coet succeed to its rights under the
Contract.
It is absurd to think that Coet gratuitously undertook
to pay off the Contract for Lopez' benefit.

Its intention,

as established by Marsha Coet's testimony and the Notice it

- 4 -

gave to Lopez, was that it had repurchased the Contract and
that Lopez' obligations under the Contract remained intact.
Lopez, without relying on any authority, suggests that
because First Security stamped the Contract "PAID 3-13-92"
when it delivered the same to Coet,2 then Lopez has only an
"equitable" obligation to repay Coet the sum Coet paid First
Security Bank.

This unique theory, while appearing to

benefit Lopez, has insidious implications for debtors in
Lopez' position.

According to Lopez, any first-party

creditor (on third-party paper) who re-acquires the paper
from the third party assignee by paying off the balance owed
acquires an "equitable" right to be reimbursed; but all
contractual-based obligations are extinguished.

That would

necessarily include contractual provisions that benefit the
debtor.

Thus, and for instance, the creditor would have the

right to immediately collect its "equitable" claim, even if
the debtor had been current on the contract-based
installment, repayment schedule.

Interest, for example,

would default to the legal 10 percent rate, even if the
contract provided for a lower rate of interest.

2

It should be noted that a copy of the Contract,
stamped "PAID", was not delivered to Lopez. This copy of
the Contract, contrary to Lopez' statement in his Reply, was
in Coet's file, and was faxed by First Security to Coet.
Coet produced the same to Lopez during the course of
discovery.
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The Court's Decision also leads to the conclusion that
First Security acted negligently in stamping the Contract
"PAID,11 and in not executing a formal document entitled
"Assignment," based on what it understood to be industry
practice.
CONCLUSION
The Court should revisit its Memorandum Decision.

The

law, as embraced by Lopez' Reply Brief, represents a quantum
departure from existing law, with potentially adverse and
unexpected implications to debtors and creditors, including
financial institutions, who undertake financing by use of
third-party paper.

If the Court intends to endorse such

significant departures from existing law, it ought to do so
only after the opportunity for hearing and publication of
its decision.
DATED this _t±_ day of May, 1995.
As counsel for the Appellee, I certify that this
Petition is presented in good faith, and not for delay.
CALLISTER NEBEKER & McCULLOUGH

By

/ j/Kd 4>^\
^yan Flsnburn, Esq.
At^6rneys for
Defendant/Appellee, Larry J.
Coet Used Car Department
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